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Introduction
In the post-2001 world substantial revision of state identities and 
interests took place. This revision resulted with an emphasis on international 
organizations’ function against global security challenges. This study focuses 
on Black Sea Region and takes it as a problematic space where economic 
and political ambivalencies exist. The crisis spots in the Balkans, and in the 
Caucasus, ethnic animosities, economic crises, enviromnental problems, 
military armaments qualify the region as an instable part of the world. 
Besides these, with increasing energy dependency of world economies and 
increasing energy bills, the existence of significant oil and gas reserves and 
transit routes in the region underlines the necessity of stability in the region. 
Such challenges made regional cooperation an unavoidable requirement. 
Therefore, functioning of international organizations, as generators and 
diffusers of international rules of conduct, appear crucial for the establishment 
of peaceful environment in which states would interact.
This study focuses on the activity of European Union (EU) and Black 
Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) in the Black Sea Region, 
and places its argumentation on their capacity to create norms, and their 
ability' to diffuse created norms to regional states — in our study to Turkey 
and Ukraine. In this effort study subscribes to constructivist approach vis-
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я-л/jc international organizations1. From constructivist point of view, agents 
of international relations interact in a social environment in which material 
conditions are socially constituted. Therefore, meanings and interpretations
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of agents and structures. Based on this approach it is possible to define 
international organizations as sources of social meanings, norms which 
continuously involve in shaping of interests, values and identities of agents. 
Exploration of levels of norm diffusion and levels of norm adoption is central 
to the effort of understanding state reactions to regional challenges.
This study first observes place of Turkey and Ukraine in world politics 
with a reflection on past processes of regional norm constructions and 
diffusions. Second part evaluates on EU’s norm diffusion tools and the recent 
level of norm adoption in the cases of Turkey and Ukraine. Last part focuses 
on В SEC as an alternative norm diffusing regional organization and evaulates 
on the ability of norm adoption in the cases of Turkey and Ukraine.
Turkey and Ukraine in the Black Sea Region
Clarifying positioning of Turkey and Ukraine, especially vis-a- 
vis the processes of norm constructions and diffusions is essential to the 
understanding of the nature of states’ current interaction in the region. This 
effort is important as the post-Cold War Black Sea region offers historically 
unique setting of states with unique qualities/capacities to influence and shape 
the character of the region.
Historically, the competition to dominate Black Sea stood at the center 
policy pillar of the regional big powers. Through these accounts of past the 
region has been dominated for centuries only by big powers. The dominance 
and control of the Byzantine, Ottoman and Russian empires constructed 1
1 For scholarly debate on this approach see, Desler, D., What’s at Stake in the Agent 
Structure Debate, International Organization,Vol. 43,1989,pp. 441 473;Onuf, K., 
and Frank Klink, Activity, Authority, Rule, International Studies Quarterly, 1989, 
Vol. 33, pp. 149-174; Guzzini, S., A Reconstruction of Constructivism in 
International Relations, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 6, 2000, 
p. 147; Newman, E., Human Security and Constructivism, International Studies 
Perspectives, Vol. 2,2001, pp. 239-251; Lezaun, J., Limiting the Social: 
Constnictivism and Social Knowledge in International Relations, International 
Studies Review, Vol. 4, Issue. 3, 2002, p. 230; Wendt, A., Levels of Analysis vs. 
Agents and Structures: Part III, Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, 1992, 
p. 183. For counter argumentation see, Barkin, J., S., Realist Constructivism, 
International Studies Review, Vol. 5, 2003, pp. 325-342.
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norms, values, identities and interests for the units of the region. Based on 
these values and identities provided by empires the agents of Black Sea region 
defined itself against the rest of the surrounding units and structures. In a 
similar vein the Soviet Union and its East European periphery surrounded 
the Black Sea, except for Turkey and Greece, and Soviet Union-centered 
constructive forces and processes have provided norms, values, identities 
and interests to the large part of the region. In any of the mentioned time 
contexts, constructive forces — which were initiated and controlled by Rome, 
Byzantine, Ottoman, Russian Empires and the Soviet Union — have had an 
unifying and integrating effect on the parts that they controlled in the Black 
Sea region2.
Currently, Turkey and Ukraine are interacting in a pluralist and 
disintegrated region, where no regional big power stands as a center of value, 
identity, rule and interest diffusion3. In this unique historical period of the 
Black Sea region the responsibility of defining norms, values and identities 
for the region is transferred to international organizations. Therefore, efficient 
establishment of “international rule of conducts” by of such organizations 
are dependent on both on organizations’ capacity to create nonns and on 
individual states’ level of norm adoption. Reactions of Ukraine and Turkey to 
constructive processes, which are initiated by the EU and BSEC, is of utmost 
importance as these two are significant members of the region.
EU Norms in the Black Sea Region and Reactions 
from Turkey and Ukraine
EU has a complex and ambivalent relations with Turkey and Ukraine, 
and will likely to be so, however, these two countries has a great potential 
to contribute to EU’s norm-making and diffusing capacities. The EU, both 
as an international organization and pre-federal structure, influence state 
behaviours in various ways with the norms that it creates. These norms, 
no doubt, create results, directly or indirectly, for the neigbouring states. 
However, success of this effort is also dependent on the adoption of norms by 
relatively significant neighbouring actors, as these actors constitute a sample 
to follow for relatively insignificant neighbouring regional actors.
For nationalization of state actors in the international system see, Rodney Bruce 
Hall, National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems, 
Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 279-300.
For discussion on post-international political space see, Yale Ferguson and
: History s Revenge and FutureRichard Mansbach, Remapping Globa! Politics:  
Shock, Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 67-107.
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The EU uses several mechanisms to influence peripheral state’s 
behaviours. Membership conditionality is one of the most influential 
EU mechanism for norm-diffusion. In addition to that, and rather recently, 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is used as a mechanism to 
diffuse EU originated norms to neighbouring states without a condition of 
membership4. Also, in the case of Black Sea Region, the EU has a region 
oriented policy which is known as “Black Sea Synergy”5. These tools work 
in various ways in the cases of Turkey and Ukraine, since the “two” has 
different positions and conditions vis-a-vis the EU. While both countries has 
a desire for full membership, currently Ukraine is in the framework of the 
ENP, and Turkey is in the framework of membership perspective.
In an effort to comprehend social contexts, which gives meanings to 
material conditions, it is also required to consider the external material 
conditions which in turn produced social construction of the EU’s behaviour 
vis-a-vis its Black Sea periphery. The fact that the social environment of 
interaction changed from EU’s point of view, especially with the aftermath 
of the Bulgaria’s and Romania’s accession and EU access to Black Sea, 
triggered a process of construction of meanings and eventual EU interests in 
the region. No doubt, this development re-determined the meaning, function 
and the content of the EU’s norm diffusion tools mentioned earlier. Such 
tools are proved to be essential for Brussels, yet not successful, based on the 
region’s quality as a transit way for the energy resources and the home for 
the instability and conflicts. Practically, based on the perception of problems, 
EU embarked especially on efforts to promote democracy and stability 
through cooperation programmes.
As to reactions from Turkey and Ukraine to EU norm diffusion, these two 
have their own continuously formulated state identities which determine their 
state interests and their responses in a given time period to norm diffusion of the 
EU. To observe the level of EU’s norm diffusion it is essential to see how domestic 
environment provide basis for construction of state identity. Embodiment of 
interests, based on the formulation of identity, determine how a state reacts
4 See Communication from the Commission “Wider Europe — Neighbourhood 
Policy: a new Framework for Relations with our eastern and Southern 
Neighbours”, 11 March 2003, COM(20Û3) 104 final and Communication from the 
Commission “European Neighbourhood Policy-Strateev Paper”. 12 May 2004. 
COM(2004)373 final.
5 For details see, Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament, “Black Sea Synergy-A New Regional Cooperation 
Initiative”, COM (2007), 169 Final, 11.04.2007.
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to a norm system which it is engaged to through the international processes. 
Therefore, it is necessary to focus on how states define their goals and how they 
define themselves in relation to other states and norm diffusing organizations.
In Turkish case, in an effort to search for the level of Turkey’s EU norm 
adoption took place, the period starting from 2002 is important as in this 
period the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkmma Partisi) largely 
determined the way Turkish identity was constructed vis-a-vis the EU. In this 
time period, the EU’s level of norm-diffusing capacity over Turkey is highly 
dependent on the Turkey’s domestic forces. The ongoing identity crisis affected, 
in a confusing manner, the way Turkey’s interests embodied and determined 
limit to the the level of EU’s norm diffusion6. From the EU aspect, the 
organization as an external actor strongly enforces its own position to achieve 
structural changes within Turkey and in any other country that it interacts. This 
approach naturally aims to create an effect on interests, beliefs and identities 
of the states that are involved in the interaction which turned out to be a quite a 
problematic issue with the Turkish government with a religious tendency.
Looking at certain landmarks of the EU-Turkey relations, the first period 
from 2002 to December 2004 marks an extensive Turkey’s norm adoption 
which ended up with EU’s decision to initiate membership negotiations with 
Turkey. In this two year period the way Turkish government formulated its 
approach to EU is dramatically different from the rest of their term in power. 
Especially after power consolidation after second term in government justice 
and Development Party (JDP) fostered a confusing international image that is 
largely based on ongoing domestic discussion of Turkish identity. No doubt, 
the first two year period and EU adoption of EU norms were expected to 
provide political ground for JDP and its popular background. However, 
this extensive norm adoption period and further rapprochement with the 
EU policies did not produce internal change in Turkey that JDP expected. The 
expectation was essentially to achieve extensive freedom to open a discussion 
over the republican ideals and values, and reach a substantial change in these 
principles7. As that process failed to produce expected result for the Turkish
6 Identity crisis has its roots in the discussion of secularism and non-secularism. 
With the Justice and Development Party in power this discussion reached its 
ultimate levels at a point of domestic conflict in every level of society. Due to 
space limitations this study excludes further argumentation of internal identity 
crises that resulted from the mentioned discussion.
For farther argumentation see, Gfilnur Aybet, “Turkey and the EU After the First 
Year of Negotiations:Reconciling Internal and Externa! Policy Challenges”, 
Security Dialogue, SAGE Publications, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 529-549, 2006.
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government, EU aspiration lost its domestic popularity, and as soon as Turkey 
went into domestic tirbuience adoption of EU norms significantly slowed 
down8 9.
As to EU front, negotiations with Turkey triggered internal problems 
in the Union. There, also started a significant discussion which covered 
issues from religion to culture and to the processes of future EU-identity 
construction. That discussion had a reflection on EU’s conceptualization of 
EU — Turkey relations. This conceptualization especially was marked by the 
special term “open-ended negotiations’” . Gradually turning into a determinant 
of membership negotiations the conceptualization openly signaled that the 
negotiations would not necessarily produce a Turkish membership in the 
EU. In Europeanizing process articulation of this “special term” and relevant 
approach limited EU’s norm-diffusing capacity over disapointed Turkey. 
This approach was especially a disapointment for pro-European circles 
who largely constructed a domestic EU image which was displaying EU as 
a just and rule based platform free from historical, political, and religious 
prejudices10 1. No doubt, for anti-EU circles this was a ground breaking proof 
of EU’s double standards and the fact that this conceptualization was first 
time articulated by EU bodies for an accessing country in EU’s history gave 
anti-EU activists a stronger hand.
As to possibilities and potential in the future; with Turkish membership 
to the EU the panaroma of the Black Sea region will no doubt substantially 
change. First, Turkey ’will find a platform in which it can define and construct 
itself as a regional leader enjoying EU backing. Turkey would more likely to 
draw an active regional image within the framework of ENP and contribute to 
diffusionofEU norms. On the other hand, Turkey’sEU membership may likely 
to lead to a new definition of the Union with respect to new neighbourhood 
in the Middle East11. This process has likelyhood of leading to increase
8 See for more information about decreasing EU support in Turkey; Sabah, 
“Türkler’in AB Oyeligine Destegi Azaldi.”, 19.12.07 (Sabah Daily Newspaper, 
“Turks’ support for the EU is decreased”).
9 See how the term was articulated at; IP/04/1 i 80, “Commission recommends to start 
negotiations with Turkey under certain conditions”, Brussels, 6 October 2004, See 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargenient/report_2004/.
10 Ortayli brings forward detailed account of self and the other in the case of 
EU and Turkey; liber Ortayli, Avrupa ve Biz, Tiirkiye Is Bankasi Kiiltiir 
Yayinlan, 2007 (liber Ortayli, Europe and Us, Turkish Is Bank Cultural 
Press, 2007).
11 See more details on Turkey’s role in Middle East; “Tilrkiye-Avrupa Birligi- 
ABD iliçkücr; Nereye GidiyorV”, TEPAV-EPRI ve TOBB Ekonomi ve Teknoloji
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in EU’s normative power within the regions that Turkey has access. Such 
redefinitions of the “EU-self5 and therefore “Eli interests” would likely to 
face repercussions from Russia. Russia may possibly find itself in an external 
environment in which it is further alieanatea and challenged, especially, 
with diminished loss of regional domination. No doubt, a potential Europe 
with global power underpinnings will eventually lead to creation of counter­
identities, norms and interests as a response from its periphery. However, 
the character of the counter-responses, either conflictual or peaceful, will be 
determined by the success of the EU’s norm diffusion to the periphery.
Based on the current fact that Turkey-EU relations is troubled with 
slowed down norm diffusion and adoption a new phase, which provide basis 
for a shift in Turkish self-identification, is initiated. What extend this new 
identification will correspond to European norms and values is standing 
before us as a question. The fact that many negotiation chapters were already 
have been vetoed by the EU is a negative indicator that Turkish norm 
adoption process will be paralyzed. Doubtlessly, a discouraged Turkey is on 
the way may most likely to orient itself to alternative self-identifications with 
references to different social sources other than European ones. Until this 
last period under consideration, Turkey attempted with full determination 
to construct itself as a part of Europe. In the meantime Ankara suffered 
through EU’s norm diffusion procedures which took place as one way norm 
exportation. Turkey took on norms without taking no part in the norm-making 
procedures of the EU. Therefore, Turkey was and still is a passive receiver 
of the EU norms which eventually reached to such a suppressing point where 
these norms degenerate national self-perception. The Turkish self-perception 
is further paralysed as negotiation process prolonged with no clear sight 
of a membership result. The current indications display that Turkey has 
weak appeal towards European sources and look for newer sources of self- 
identification. In that perspective Turkey is likely to appeal to an identity 
which provides more room for relations with Eastern neighbours and with 
Black sea countries.
To questions of how Ukraine’s domestic balances are constructed vis-a- 
vis EU’s norms and values, and how EU as an external dynamic contributed 
to Ukraine’s internal constructions as a co-constructer, European discourse 
of Ukrainian parties provide indicators. T hese processes no doubt complex
Universitesi, Uluslararasi Iliskiler BOliimu, Ortak Cahstay Raporu, Mart 2006, 
(Where Turkey-EU-US relations are heading?, TErAV-EPRI and University 
of TOBB Economy and Technology, Department of International Relations, 
Common Conference Report, March 2006).
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which this study can not embark on due to limitations, however, study will 
suffices to evaluate on major domestic discourse.
When looked at the Ukraine’s approach to EU the period 
since 2005 displays quite different features. Compared to the character 
of Ukraine’s EU approach prior to 2005, the post-2005 EU discourse of 
Ukraine is relatively better founded and depended on a political base. During 
the period of the “Orange Revolution” pro-Western and pro-European 
discourse of Orange parties emerged as a crucial effort to re-construct a 
domestic Ukrainian identity which would re-introduce Ukrainian state to the 
international environment with a different image. No doubt this discourse was 
counter by pro-Eastem constructive agents and processes and contributed to 
the construction of Ukrainian identity in a continuously competitive manner. 
What is observed here is that this internal interaction produced an relatively 
more pro-European state identity due to upperhand of pro-Western political 
discourse in political mechanisms. While this upperhand provided some 
grounds for norm adoption in Ukraine, the pro-Western discourse is balanced 
by a strong pro-Eastem discourse. Additionally, in a similar vein with Turkey, 
internal problems and political turmoils in Ukraine limited the norm adoption 
capacity of Kiev and therefore, limited the norm diffusion of EU. Years 
since 2005 swept away high expectations of internal and external circles, who 
relied on pro-Western “Orange Revolution”12. Despite expectations of many, 
“Orange Revolution” fall short of solving major part of domestic questions. 
The case of political power struggle between offices of presidency and prime 
ministry, during Victor Yanukovich’s office as a prime minister, reflected the 
nature of internal painstaking dynamics of identity construction. No doubt, 
continuation of power struggle between presidency and prime ministry had 
its affect in slowing down the adoption of EU norms.
From EU’s perspective, even though Brussels fostered sympathy 
towards Ukraine, during and immediately after “Orange Revolution”, 
that sympathy did not offer Kiev a future membership promise. However, 
EU sufficed to further tailor the existent frameworks of interaction and 
focused further diffusion of EU norms to Ukraine. EU strongly sticks to 
its “Neighborhood” framework as the major platform for relations with 
Ukraine. The ENP document is a doubtlessly a tool of norm diffusion13.
12 See Motyl, J. Alexander, Failed States, Vol. 29 (4), Harvard International Review, 
Winter 2008.
13 See Baraeani, Elena, “The EU and Democracy Promotion: A Strategy of 
Democratization in the Framework of Neighbourhood Policy”, Fulvio Attina 
and Rosa Rossi (eds.), European Neighbouhood Policy: Political, Economic and
—  216 —
МАТЕРІАЛИ МІЖНАРОДНОЇ НАУКОВОЇ КОНФЕРЕНЦІЇ
28-30 травня 2008 року
To that effect, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for 
Extemai Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy underlined that 
EU’s “soft power” quality as a lavarage to spread out European values14 15. 
These values stand for eventual Europeanization!5. On the toher hand, 
contrasting to EU’s will to diffuse its norms via ENP platform, Ukraine 
officially rejects this tool of norm diffusion which essentially has no quality 
to bring future Union membership. Contending expectations of the both 
sides are constructing the nature of relations and will likely to stay as a 
determinant of relations of the two. Currently Ukraine perceives EU and 
Europe as overlapping conceptual constructs and based on that as much 
as EU constructs Ukraine as a neighbour it will initiate a paralyzation of 
Ukrainian pro-European rhetoric of “going back to Europe”16.
As long as EU does not provide Kiev the necessary platform which 
would contribute to both internal and external construction of Ukrainian 
identity, Ukraine is likely to fail in construction of a self identity with a 
western underpinnings. There is little question that appereance of Ukraine’s 
EU fatigue will take quite a time, but Kiev’s prolonging realization of 
EU membership will eventually weaken Ukrainian pro-European discourse 
and re-orient pro-European and pro-Western political actors in the country to 
alternative discourses of identity.
In the face of prolonging EU process and hardships of norm diffusion 
and in the face of a need for extemai source of a Ukrainian self construction, 
Ukraine may likely to follow the path that Turkey follow and gradually loose 
hopes for EU integration17. Based on this possibility we need to consider
Social Issues, Jean Monnet Centre, University of Catania, 2004. See also Borzel, 
T and Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe: In K. Featherstone 
and C Radaelli (eds), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2003, pp. 57-80.
14 Speeches by EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero Waldner, “The European
Neighbourhood Policy”, Ref: Spo6-226EN, European Commission,
Stockholm, 7 March 2006 and “The European Union and the World: A Hard look 
at Soft Power”, Columbia University, New York, 24 September 2007.
15 For more argumentation on the concept of “Europeanization” see; Johan Olsen, 
“The Many Faces of Europeanization, ARENA Working Papers, 2002. Borzel, 
T. And Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe: In KFeathestone 
and C.Radelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford:Oxford University 
Press, pp. 57-80.
16 Therefore, Ukraine Left out of the EU is left out of Europe.
17 In Ukraine EU aspiration is articulated as an essential process of Ukrainian 
national unity. Internally EU’s image is constructed as a source of welfare, and
—  217 —
СПАДЩИНА ОМЕЛЯНА ПРЩАКА
1 СУЧАСШ ГУМАНІТАРНІ НАУКИ
other available international platforms which may be activated to create norm 
orders and sources of external identification.
The BSEC us u Norm-Making Platform
This part looks at BSEC and evaluates on its future potential to 
make and diffuse norms. The initial motive behind the establishment of 
BSEC was to end East-West confrontation in the region and to develop closer 
relations among regional states. Therefore, to address regional problems at 
multinational platform Ankara and Kiev pioneered the establishment of the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC). BSEC was perceived by the post- 
Communist regional states to be a tool of transition to market economy and 
platform for integration to global economy18.
In 1998, with the consensus reached at Yalta, BSEC re-designed as a 
full-fledged regional organization. This re-structuring on a new legal basis 
generated operational mechanisms for BSEC. These new mechanisms 
became operational in May 1999. The cooperation through BSEC served well 
in several aspects. First one is environmental issues. Black Sea Ecological 
Program became operational to reach lower levels of pollution in the Black 
Sea. Second successful aspect is measures taken against organized crime. 
The Cooperation in Combating Crime Declaration (1998) constituting the 
basis for cooperation on this question defined investigation, disclosure, 
prevention of acts of terrorism, organized crime, corruption, trafficking 
drugs and weapons as priorities. Third, aspect is cooperation in building 
communications substructure. Problems in this field addressed with the 
conduct of Trans-Asia Europe, Black Sea Fiber Optic Cable System, Trans 
Europe Telecommunication Project, Italy-Ukraine-Turkey-Russia Fiber Optic 
Project, Black Sea Fiber Optic Submarine Cable System and TransBalkan 
Link. Therefore, with these mechanisms in operation the organization has an 
acting floor for norm making and norm diffusion.
In the functioning of the organization and its norm making processes 
Turkey plays a leading role and tried to sustain increased regional cooperation.
since welfare is appealing for all eventually brings Ukrainian people together — 
who are dived on major national and international issues. From this aspect the 
way EU idea is constructed in Ukraine and Turkey differs. Although the Kemaiist 
modernization process, was based on pro-European and pro-Western orientation, 
currently EU started to be seen as a threat to the unity of Turkey.
18 Gtiltekin, B., and Ayse Mumcu, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, in, V. Mastny 
and R. Craig Nation, (eds.), Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for 
a Rising Regional Power, Westview Pres, 1996, p. 179.
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This initiative of Turkey was based on the fact that Ankara considered itself as 
a regional leader after the end of the Cold War. Being at the intersection point of 
regions —  Middle East, Southeastern Europe, Black Sea, Caspian Region — 
Turkey continues to claim special status with historical, economic and cultural 
access to the neighbouring regions. Being a member of BSEC, Turkey 
constructs itself as the critical and required actor in bringing stability to the 
region. Turkey’s prolonging EU membership process turns BSEC platform for 
Turkey to contribute more into the regional norm creation process19.
At a period when regional states namely Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, 
are threatened by a regional country, Russian Federation, B SEC’s likelyhood 
of becoming a platform for these countries to generate common norms and 
rules is increased. So far the weight of norm and rule diffusion, in the face of 
regional challenges, was put on EU and NATO enlargements. However, these 
organizations are internally and externally challenged by certain factors in their 
respective future enlargements. Since these organizations fail to import norms 
and rules to the Black Sea region the region is facing substantial instability. 
The EU alternative norm diffusion tools created, other than membership 
tool, are not satisfactory especially in the cases of Turkey and Ukraine. 
Further instability of Turkey and Ukraine, as larger and critical countries of 
the region, due to troubles in the norm diffusion processes has likelihood of 
troubling regional peace. Both countries are in need of external source to 
ensure domestic reforms, protection of state unity and modernization. Both 
of the countries are example of civilizational confusion, which further makes 
external sources of norms and values essential. Waiting for the non-promised 
EU membership is likely to create a fatigue which we can currently observe 
in Turkey. Therefore, the EU based constructive processes will be devoid of 
diffusing substantial normative order to these countries. In the face of this 
presumption BSEC is a potential platform in which fall member Ukraine 
and Turkey can create a regional normative order, diffuse it to the region and 
construct their regional identities upon it.
So far, in the BSEC platform Ukraine and Turkey highlighted 
technological ana social progress in support of the economic cooperation.
15 Aybak even brings forward Turkish initiative to establish a Black Sea Coooeration 
framework in the very beginning of 1990’s, as an alternative initiative to stagnating 
EU prospects of Turkey. Turkey applied for EC membership in 1987 and received 
a negative response in 1989 with the declared Avis. See for the argumentation 
of Turkish attitude, Tunc Aybak, Black Sea Economic Cooperation and Turkey: 
Extending European Integration to the East?, in Tunc Aybak, (ed.), Politics of the 
Black Sea: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict, I. B. Tauris, 2001, p. 33.
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Economic perspective of the cooperation is emphasized as a tool to transform 
region into a peaceful, stable and prosper space. Countries agreed that 
this could only be achieved by economic prosperity and interdependence. 
BSEC gradually becomes a platform for regional relations with its prospects 
for cooperation in transportation, communications, information, finance and 
ecology. Ankara and Kiev also shared the aim that BSEC would serve for 
peaceful settlement of disputes in the region.
Initially BSEC was not constructed as an alternative regional project 
to replace the Euro-Atlantic organizations. It was seen as a complementary 
organization to support the integration of the region with the rest of the 
continent and the World. This vision so far limited the horizons of the 
BSEC countries. However, BSEC is likely to appear as leverage for full 
integration of region to the world based on the norm construction process 
of its own. Regional norm creation process which naturally include Russian 
Federation may have higher chances to create its own order and balance 
the challenges and threats that are coming from within. Finally, Turkey and 
Ukraine which may stay outside of the EU may construct themselves an 
identity in which they may define their own dignity and be recognized as 
respectable partners and primary counterparts in world politics.
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